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Résumé / Abstract 
 
On propose un nouveau critère d’évaluation du bien-être social qui satisfait trois propriétés : 
sensibilité au bien-être des membres infortunés de la société, sensibilité au bien-être des 
générations futures, et sensibilité au bien-être des générations présentes. On obtient les 
conditions nécessaires pour le sentier optimal sous ce nouveau critère et on montre que le 
sentier optimal existe dans un modèle d’accumulation du capital sous des conditions 
normales. Le sentier optimal converge à un état stationnaire qui dépend de la condition 
initiale. Le long de ce sentier, la contrainte sur le niveau de bien-être minimal, qui est choisi 
endogènement, est satisfaite avec égalité pendant une certaine phase. Les sentiers optimaux 
ont des propriétés qui semblent satisfaisantes sur le plan éthique. 
 
Mots clés : bien-être social, juste distribution, développement soutenable, 




This paper proposes a new welfare criterion which satisfies three desiderata: strong 
sensitivity to the least advantaged, sensitivity to the present, and sensitivity to the future. We 
develop necessary conditions for optimal paths under this new criterion, and demonstrate 
that, in a familiar dynamic model of capital accumulation, the optimal growth path exists. The 
optimal path converges to a steady state which is dependent on the initial stock of capital. 
Along this path, the minimum standard of living constraint, which is optimally chosen, is 
binding over some time interval. Optimal paths under the new criterion display properties 
that seem to be ethically appealing. 
 
Keywords: welfare, distributive justice, sustainable development, 
intergenerational equity 
 
Codes JEL : H4, I3, O2, Q56 
                                                 
* CIRANO and CIREQ, Department of Economics, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St West, Montreal,  
H3A 2T7, Canada. Email: ngo.long@mcgill.ca. 1 Introduction
Comparing utility streams in the inﬁnite-time-horizon context has been a
perplexing issue confronting philosophers and economists. In an article ti-
tled “A Neglected Family of Aggregation Problems in Ethics”, published in
Noûs (1976), the philosopher Krister Segerberg poses the following problem
in ethics:
Suppose Pascal is interested in what will happen to him after his death.
“He believes that eternity consists of inﬁnitely many days [and] that when his
body is dead his soul will spend each following day in Heaven or Hell...Outcomes
can be represented by inﬁnite sequences {0 {1=== {q===> where each {q is either
1(Heaven) or 0(Hell)....Problems arise when he wants to compare prospects
containing both 1’s and 0’s. Particularly di!cult is it to deal with prospects
containing inﬁnitely many 1’s and also inﬁnitely many 0’s.”(p. 226). (He did
not refer to any related work by economists.)
In economics, this type of problem is often addressed in a context that
involves the utilities not of the same person in successive periods, but rather
of distinct individuals in successive generations. Perhaps Ramsey (1928) was
the ﬁrst economist to have articulated this problem. According to Ramsey, it
is unethical to discount the utilities of future generations. Various utilitarian
welfare criteria that do not use discounting have been proposed. (See Dia-
mond (1965), Koopmans (1965), von Weizsäcker (1965), Gale (1967), among
others.) There are also non-utilitarian criteria such as maximin1,a n ds u !-
cientarianism.2
All the existing criteria have been subjected to criticism. Chichilnisky
(1996) points out that the utilitarian criterion with positive discounting im-
plies “dictatorship of the present”, while criteria such the long-run average
1Maximin is often attributed to Rawls, but, as I have argued elsewhere (Long, 2005),
in the context of intergeneraltional equity such attribution is completely unfair to Rawls.
2See for example Chichilnisky (1977), Frankfurt (1988), Waltzer (1983), Anderson
(1999), Arneson (2002), and Roemer (2003).
2criterion and the catching-up criterion imply “dictatorship of the future.”
She proposed a criterion that has some desirable properties, including “non-
dictatorship of the present” and “non-dictatorship of the future”3. The 1996-
Chichilnisky welfare function is a weighted average of two terms. The ﬁrst
term is the usual sum of discounted utilities, and the second term depends
only on the limiting properties of the utility sequence. Unfortunately, when
one tries to ﬁnd paths in familiar models using Chichilnisky criterion, typically
one discovers that they do not exist.
In this paper, I introduce the concept of “non-dictatorship of the least
advantaged” and propose a social welfare function that satisﬁes this property
and yet embodies the Rawlsian insistence that the least advantaged deserve
special considerations. This welfare function is a weighted average of (i) the
usual sum of discounted utilities, and (ii) the utility level of the least advan-
taged generation. I call this new criterion the Mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion
(MBRC). I develop a set of necessary conditions to characterize growth paths
that satisfy MBRC, and show that in some models with familiar dynamic
speciﬁcations, an optimal path under MBRC exists and displays appealing
characteristics.
2 A theoretical framework
In order to facilitate comparison, I shall adopt a common theoretical frame-
work in which the welfare criteria that I discuss below can be explained. I
consider an economy with inﬁnitely many generations. Since I wish to focus
on the question of “distributive justice among generations”, I shall make the
simplifying assumption that within each generation, all individuals receive the
same income and have the same tastes. Thus, by assumption, the question of
3In addition to these properties, she requires that the social welfare function be Paretian
and satisfy the axiom of “continuity” and “independence” (in the sense of linearity.) She
showed that none of the criteria I mentioned in the preceding paragraph satisﬁes all the
required properties.
3equity within each generation does not arise. This framework has been used
in, for intances, Solow (1974), Hartwick (1977), Dasgupta and Heal (1979,
Chapters 9-10), Dixit et al. (1980), Long and Yang (1998), Mitra (1983),
Chichilnisky (1996), and Long, Mitra and Sorger (1996).
Let fw denote the vector of consumption (of various goods and services)
allocated to the representative individual of generation w.L e txw  x(fw) be
the life-time utility of this individual. (xw is a real number, and x(=) is a
real-valued function). For most of what follows, I shall interpret “utility” as
“standard of living”of individuals, rather than some kind of happiness they get
when consuming and/or contemplating their childrens’ and grandchildrens’
life prospects. To ﬁx ideas, it is convenient to assume that each individual
lives for just one period. Consider for the moment two alternative projects,




















w stands for xw(fl
w).
I assume that while an individual of generation w m i g h tc a r ea b o u tt h e
consumption vector of his/her son or daughter, fw+1, and that of his/her4
grandson or granddaughter, fw+2,t h e s ev e c t o r sh a v en oi m p a c to nt h e“ u t i l i t y ”
level xw.T h u si tm i g h tb ep r e f e r a b l et or e f e rt oxw as the “standard of living”
rather than “utility” of generation w.
For simplicity of notation, I shall use the symbol ul to denote the utility
stream {xl
w}w=1>2>===> =Roughly speaking, a welfare criterion is a way of ranking
all possible utility streams. Let V be the set of all possible utility streams.
A welfare function, denoted by Z,with supercsripts to distinguish among
dierent types, is a function that maps elements of V to the real number line.
Ia l s or e f e rt oZ(=) as the “social welfare function”5.
4To avoid repetitive uses of his/her etc., in all that follows, when referring to hypothet-
ical persons, I shall use the masculin gender, on the understanding that it embraces the
feminin gender.
5This usage is quite common, see, for example, Chichilnisky (1996, p. 240), Basu
4To simplify matters, I shall assume that the function x(=) is bounded.
Assumption 1: (Boundedness) Utility is bounded
D  x(f)  E
Remark 1: The number E is the highest possible level of utility. I shall
refer to E the “Bliss Utility Level”.
In what follows, I consider only welfare functions Z(=) that are non-
decreasing6 in xw. That is, if the utility level of one generation increases, the
social welfare cannot decrease. This is the well known Paretian property7.
Property P:(Paretian Property) Welfare is non-decreasing in xw.
In surveying some existing welfare criteria that have been considered by
economists, I shall classify welfare criteria into two classes: the class of utili-
tarian criteria, and the class of non-utilitarian criteria.
Utilitarian criteria permit comparing (and trading-o)a ni n c r e m e n ti n
the utility level of an individual (or group of individuals) with a ‘decrement’
(negative change) in the utility level of another individual (or group). A
familiar example is the “utilitarian criterion with discounting”.
Under the “Utilitarian Criterion with Discounting” (at a constant rate
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and Mitra (2003). This is to be distinguished from Arrow’s use of the term “social welfare
function” which is a mapping from the space of all possible individual preference orderings
(of social states) to the space of social orderings.
6We do not address the question of existence of a social welfare function Z(=) here.
Diamond (1965) shows that if one requires that Z(=) must satisfy the strict Paretian
property, a weak form of anonymity and some kind of continuity, then Z(=) does not
exist. Basu and Mitra (2003) conﬁrm Diamond’s result even without requiring continuity.
Svensson (1980) however shows that if, instead of seeking a (real-valued) function, we
merely look for the ability to rank inﬁnite streams of utilities, then existence (of a social
welfare relation, or ordering) is ensured.
7The Paretian Property can be strengthened to the “Strict Paretian Property” by
replacing the word “non-decreasing” by “increasing”.
5According to this criterion, a utility stream um is ranked higher than a utility
stream ul if and only if Z(um) AZ (ul). Thus, a small decrease in the
utility level of an individual (no matter how badly o he already is) can be
justiﬁed by some increase in the utility level of some other individuals.
Non-utilitarian criteria do not permit such trading o.A ne x a m p l eo fn o n -
utilitarian criteria is the “Maximin Criterion,”denoted by Zp.A c c o r d i n gt o
this criterion, a utility stream ul is ranked higher than utility stream um if
and only if the utility level of the worst o generation in stream ul is higher















While many people refer to the “Maximin Criterion” as the “Rawlsian Cri-
terion”, named after John Rawls, author the inﬂuential work “A Theory of
Justice”(1971, 1999), it has been argued (see, for example, Long, 2005, and
references cited therein) that, in the context of welfare comparison of inﬁ-
nite utility streams, it is unfair to Rawls to attribute the Maximin Criterion
to him. He has always insisted that such a criterion is not acceptable as a
criterion for justice among generations.
3 A Review of Some Welfare Criteria
3.1 The Utilitarian Criterion With Discounting
This criterion is most widely used by economists. Any standard graduate
macroeconomic textbook has at least a chapter on how a “representative,
inﬁnitely-lived individual” chooses his consumption path to maximize the
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subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. In such textbooks, welfare
implications of government policies are also evaluated using the same criterion.
6Perhaps the main reason for the popularity of this criterion is that it gives
rise to an optimization problem that can be solved in a relatively simple way.
However, simplicity or solvability are not good reasons for accepting a welfare
criterion. There are valid criticisms of this criterion, the most important one
being its insensitivity to the utility of very distant generations.
The utilitarian criterion with discounting has been attacked by many
economists, from Ramsey (1928) to Chichilnisky (1996), and others. Let
me quote a forceful example from Chichilnisky (1996, page 235):
“...Discounting future utility is generally inconsistent with sustainable de-
velopment. It can produce outcomes which seem patently unjust to later
generations. Indeed, under any positive discount rate, the long-run future is
deemed irrelevant. For example, at a standard 5% discount rate, the present
value of the earth’s aggregate output discounted 200 years from now, is a few
hundred thousand dollars. A simple computation shows that if one tried to
decide how much it is worth investing in preventing the destruction of the
earth 200 years from now, the answer would be no more than one is willing
to invest in an apartment.”
Chichilnisky (1996) argues that all utilitarian criterion with discounting
put too much emphasis on the present. In fact this criterion displays insensi-
tivity to the utility of distant generations. To formalize this idea, let us deﬁne
(Wsl>aW) to be a utility sequence obtained from sl by replacing all elements
of vl except the ﬁrst W elements by the tail of the utility sequence a,w h e r e












Consider the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1: (dictatorship of the present- Chichilnisky 1996)
A welfare criterion Z(=) is said to display “dictatorship of the present” if
the following condition holds:
7For every pair (sl>sm), Z(sl) AZ (sm) if and only if, for all W su!-
ciently large8, Z(Wsl>aW) AZ (Wsm>bW) for all pairs of sequences (a>b),
where (Wsl>aW) means that all elements of sl except the ﬁrst W elements are
replaced by the tail of the sequence a,a n d(Wsm>bW) means that all elements
of sm except the ﬁrst W elements are replaced by the tail of the sequence b.
In other words, dictatorship of the present means that any modiﬁcation of
utility levels of generations far away in the future would not be able to reverse
the welfare ranking of two utility streams. Given our boundedness assump-
tion, the utilitarian criterion with positive discounting displays dictatorship
of the present.
A welfare function is said to display “non-dictatorship of the present” if
there exists some pair (sl>sm) such that Z(sl) AZ(sm) and some modiﬁca-
tions to utilities of individuals in the distant future can reverse the ranking.
3.2 The Long-Run Average Criterion
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eL o n g - R u nA v e r a g eC r i t e r i o n 9,s t r e a mul is declared to be
better than stream um if there exists some w0  0 and some number qA1




















The Long-Run Average Criterion favours the future generations at the
expense of the present generation. Welfare comparison using this criterion
depends only on the utility levels of generations born in the distant future.
Chichilnisky (1996) pointed out that the Long-Run Average Criterion gives a
“dictatorial role” to the future. Formally, a welfare criterion Z(=) is said to
give a dictatorial role to the future if it has the following property:
8More precisely, for all WAb W for some b W that may depend on ul and um.
9There are several ways in which the Long-Run Average Criterion can be deﬁned.
However, they all have the same bias against the present generation.
8Deﬁnition 2: (dictatorship of the future; Chichilnisky 1996)
A welfare criterion Z(=) is said to display “dictatorship of the future” if
the following condition holds:




W) for all pairs of sequences (a>b),
where (Wa>sl
W) means that the ﬁrst W elements of sl is replaced by the vector
Wa  (d1>d 2>===>dW),a n d(Wb>s
m
W) means that the ﬁrst W elements of sm is
replaced by the vector Wb  (e1>e 2>==>eW).
A welfare function is said to display “non-dictatorship of the future” if
there exists some pair (sl>sm) such that Z(sl) AZ (sm) and some modi-
ﬁcations to utilities of individuals in the early generations can reverse the
ranking.
3.3 The Distance-from-Bliss Criterion
The “Distance-from-Bliss Criterion”, proposed by Ramsey (1928), is denoted
by ZE. According to this criterion, stream ul is ranked higher than stream












Note that the sums may fail to converge, in which case we must use other
criteria for comparison.
3.4 The Overtaking Criterion
The Overtaking Criterion was proposed by Koopmans (1965) and von Weizsäcker
(1965). According to this criterion, stream ul is better than stream um if the
cumulative sum (up to time W) of the dierences xl
w  x
m
w is positive for all W
su!ciently large.
10More presisely, for all WANwhere N may depend on (sl>sm).















If there exists a time b WA0 such that for all W  b W, GW(ul  um) A 0 then
under the overtaking criterion, stream ul is considered to be better than um.
In other words, in the cumulative performance sense, stream ul eventually
“overtakes” stream um.
3.5 The Catching-Up Criterion
A major problem with the Overtaking Criterion is that the sequence {GW(ul  um)}W=1>2>3>===
may fail to converge to a limit. For any given wA0,d e n o t eb y}w the greatest









By deﬁnition {}w}w=1>2>3>===is a monotone non-decreasing sequence, so it must














The sequence ul is said to “catch up” with the sequence um if
lim
w<"}w  0
The “Catching-Up Criterion”, proposed by Gale (1967), says that sequence














103.6 The Chichilnisky Non-dictatorship Criterion
Chichilnisky argued that both dictatorship of the present and dictatorship of
the future are undesirable. She proposed a criterion that rules out both forms
of dictatorship.










where 0 ??1, 0 ? w ? 1>
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This social welfare function clearly has the properties of “non-dictatorship of
the present” and “non-dictatorship of the future”.
It is interesting to observe that ZF is a weighted average (a convex combi-
nation) of two functions that are themselves based on rejected welfare criteria.
The ﬁrst function, !(ul) = limw<" xl




w , implies dictatorship of the present. A convex
combination that gives strictly positive weights to two “undesirable” welfare
functions is free from their associated undesirable properties.
A major problem with the Chilchinisky welfare function ZF(=) is that
for many growth models, including the familiar one-sector growth model,
there does not exist an optimal path under this objective function. The intu-
ition behind this non-existence is as follows. The function !(ul)=l i m w<"xl
w
would insist on reaching the Golden Rule capital stock. The second function,
P"
w=1 wxl
w, would insist on reaching, instead, the Modiﬁed Golden Rule capi-
tal stock. Any path ul that goes near the Modiﬁed Golden Rule capital stock
and eventually veers to the Golden Rule capital stock at some time Wl will
11This welfare function satisﬁes the axioms of “non-dictatorship of the present” and
“non-dictatorship of the future.” If two more axioms are added, “continuity” and “inde-
pendence” (in the sense of linearity), then this is the only form the welfare function can
take.
11be beaten by another path um that does a similar thing but at a later date
Wm AW l.T h el a t t e rp a t hum in turn will be beaten by another path uk with
Wk AW m and so on. So an optimal path does not exist.
3.7 The Satisfaction of Basic Needs Criterion, or Suf-
ﬁcientarianism
Several economists and philosophers12 have advocated development programs
that aim at guaranteeing everybody “good-enough”, or “su!cient” levels of
primary goods, while allowing some people to have more than what is consid-
ered su!cient. Suppose that utility is measured such that, for some number
b x,i fxw  b x then basic needs are deemed to be satisﬁed at time w.L e tW(ul)






  b x for all   w
ª
The Satisfaction of Basic Needs Criterion says that ul is better than um if





The Satisfaction of Basic Needs Criterion (or Su!cientarianism) implies a
form of insensitivity to the utility of distant future generations, i.e., it displays
dictatorship of the present. Another di!culty with the notion of basic needs
is the challenge of deﬁning “good enough” levels of primary goods. Arneson
(2003, p. 173) proposes that “it might be stipulated that everyone has enough
income and wealth when nobody has less than some fraction of the average
level.” But clearly what is deemed “su!cient” in year 2000 would not be good
enough for year 2050, say.
12See Chichilnisky (1977), Frankfurt (1988), Waltzer (1983), Anderson (1999), Arneson
(2002), and Roemer (2003).
123.8 The Maximin Criterion
Rawls (1958, 1963, 1971, 1999) argues that, in contexts that do not involve the
question of justice among generations, in deciding on whether a distribution
of income is preferable to another, the only relevant things to look at are the
utility levels of the worse o individual in each distribution. According to
Rawls, one ought to choose the distribution with the highest utility level for
the worse o individuals. This is often called the maximin criterion.13
Many economists have applied the maximin principle to the problem of
intergenerational equity (without paying attention to Rawls’ objection.) The
value taken on by the social welfare function under the maximin criterion is













Let us deﬁne “dictatorship of the least advantaged” as follows:
Deﬁnition 3: (dictatorship of the least advantaged)14
A welfare criterion Z(=) is said to display “dictatorship of the least ad-
vantaged” if the following condition holds:





















As I have emphasized elsewhere (Long, 2005), in the context of intergener-
ational distributive justice, Rawls (1971, 1999) is opposed to the dictatorship
13We should note in passing that the maximin criterion does not satisfy the strict
Paretian property, but a strengthened form of it, called the leximin criterion,d o e s .L e x -
imin (or lexical maximin) requires that if several streams of the utilities have the same
maximin, then society must choose the one where the utility of the second worse o indi-
vidual is highest, and so on. See Sen (1976), Rawls (1999, p.72), Roemer (2005), Roemer
and Veneziani (2005), and Silvestre (2005).
14It is clear that non-dictatorship of the present and non-dictatorship of the future rule
out dictatorship of the least advantaged.
13of the least advantaged: ...“the dierence principle does not apply to the sav-
ings problem....The principle is inapplicable and it would seem to imply...that
there be no savings at all” (Rawls, 1971, p. 291). He proposed instead a
principle of just savings (see Long, 2005, for a discussion; see also Appendix
2 of the present paper.)
4 A new proposal: The Mixed Bentham-Rawls
Criterion
In this section, I propose a new welfare criterion which is arguably consistent
with Rawls’s principle of just savings. I call it the Mixed Bentham-Rawls
Criterion (or MBR criterion), and denote it by ZEU where the super-
script EU refers to Bentham and Rawls. I shall at ﬁrst present a basic version
of the MBR criterion15. Subsequently, I shall discuss a more general version.
4.1 The Basic MBR Criterion
Consider a Rawlsian hypothetical original position, under the assumption
that the contracting parties are family lines. A family line is at the same time
“one” and “many”. Being “one”, it is like a single individual. There are no
valid reasons to object to an individual’s discounting of his future consump-
tion. But a family line is also “many.” The worse o individuals have special
claims not unlike the those accorded to the “contemporaneous individuals”
of the simple Rawlsian model without intergenerational considerations.It is
therefore arguable that each contracting party would (i) place special weight
on the uitility level of the least advantaged generation, and (ii) care about
the sum of weighted utilities of all generations. It seems also sensible to al-
low a trade-o between (i) and (ii) above, because each party represents a
family line. The standard utilitarian tradition would treat a family line as an
15An earlier version of this new welfare criterion was stated in Long (2005).
14inﬁnitely-lived individual. This could however result in requiring great sacri-
ﬁces of early generations who are typically poor. In contrast, the approach
proposed here avoids imposing very high rates (of savings) at the earlier stages
of accumulation.
Consider a pair of utility streams (ul>um).F o rag i v e n 5 [0>1],a n da n y
given time W, I denote by ZEU
W (ul) the weighted average of (a) the utility of
the least advantaged generation over the horizon W, and (b) the cumulative
W-truncated life-time utility of the ﬁctitious inﬁnitely-lived individual using
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W (ul  um)
ª
W=1>2>3>=== may fail to have a limit. Let us
consider, for any given wA0, the greatest lower bound of the sequence
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As w gets larger and larger, }EU





w=1>2>3>===is a monotone non-decreasing sequence), so it must have a limit





















then I say sequence ul is able to “catch up” with sequence um under the MBR
criterion.
15Deﬁnition NW: A utility sequence ul is said to be no worse than a
















We denote this by ul % um.
Deﬁnition CU: A growth path is called “catch-up optimal under the
Mixed-Bentham-Rawls Criterion” if the resulting utility sequence is no worse
(in the sense of Deﬁnition NW) than any other feasible utility sequence.
Remark 1: For  5 (0>1), the MBR criterion has the following properties:
(i) Paretian
(ii) Non-dictatorship of the future
(iii) Non-dictatorship of the present
(iv) Non-dictatorship of the least advantaged.
Clearly, the MBR welfare criterion can be seen as a compromise between
the maximin criterion (which is obtained by setting  =1 )a n dt h es t a n d a r d
utilitarian criterion with discounting (which can be obtained by setting  =
0). However, the reason for proposing this mixed criterion is not to achieve
compromise for the sake of compromising. Rather, the virtue of this new
criterion is that it reﬂects the dual nature of a family line.
In what follows, I shall present a simple model of economic growth, and
show that the use of the MBR welfare criterion does indeed generate consump-
tion/investment paths that seem quite appealing to our notion of justice.
4.2 The Discrete-Time Maximum Principle under the
MBR Criterion
I consider a dynamic system consisting of a vector of state variables {w (inter-
preted as stocks of productive assets) and a vector of control variables fw.L e t
16w be an index of exogenous technological progress. The transition equation
is
{w+1  {w = j({w>f w>w)
where j(=) is twice dierentiable in ({>f>).T h ep e r i o dw utility function is
xw = x({w>f w>w)
where x(=) is twice dierentiable in ({>f).A t a n y t i m e w,g i v e n{w and w,
the control variables fw must satisfy some feasibility conditions, expressed as
inequality constraints
k({w>f w>w)  0.( 1 )
For any given {1 and W, consider the W period optimization problem
maxZ
p










subject to the transition equation, the inequality constraints (1), and {W+1 
0.
I now derive the necessary conditions for this problem. I introduce a
control parameter x, and require that {w>f w be chosen such that
x({w>f w>w)  x (2)
Our objective function becomes: given {1,c h o o s et h en u m b e rx and sequences
{fw}w=1>2>===>W and {{w}w=2>3>===>W+1to maximize
Z
p





subject to the constraint (2), the transition equations
j({w>f w>w)+{w  {w+1 =0for w =1 >2>===>W (4)
the inequality constraints (1), and {W+1  0.
17Notice that, given the technology and the initial stock {1,i fx is too
great, then there is no feasible path that satisﬁes (2). Let xmax be the least
upperbound on the set of x such that feasible paths exists.
Deﬁne the over-all Lagrangian function
O











{w [j({w>f w>w)+{w  {w+1]+wk({w>f w>w)}





$w +( 1 )
w¤
xf({w>f w>w)+wjf({w>f w>w)+wkf({w>f w>w)=0for w =1 >2>===>W
where





$w +( 1 )
w¤
x{({w>f w>w)w31+w [1 + j{({w>f w>w)]+wk{({w>f w>w)=0for w =2 >3>===>
CO0
C{W+1
= W  0 (with W{W+1 =0 )
CO0
Cw






$w  0 ( =0if x ?x max)
$w  0, x({w>f w>w)  x  0 and $w [x({w>f w>w)  x]=0
It will be useful to rearrange the above necessary conditions in terms of the
following present-value Hamiltonian function and present-value Lagrangian
function
K(w>{w>f w>w)  (1  )
wx({w>f w>w)+wj({w>f w>w)
18O(w>{w>f w>w> w>$ w)  K(w>{w>f w>w)+wk({w>f w>w)+$w [x({w>f w>w)  x]
Then the necessary conditions can also be stated as follows.
The discrete-time maximum principle with optimal self-imposed
minimum standard of living:
(i) The maximum condition: The vector of control variables fw maxi-






$w +( 1 )
w¤
xf({w>f w>w)+wjf({w>f w>w)+wkf({w>f w>w)=0
for w =1 >2>===>W>where
w  0 , k({w>f w>w)  0 and wk({w>f w>w)=0
(ii) The adjoint equations: The evolution of the vector of shadow prices
w satisﬁes the “arbitrage condition”
ww31 = 




$w +( 1 )
w¤
x{({w>f w>w)wk{({w>f w>w)
for w =1 >2>===>W>
(iii) The transition equations satisfy




for w =2 >3>===>W+1 .




$w  0 ( =0if x ?x max)
$w  0 and $w [x({w>f w>w)  x]=0
(v) The transversality condition on terminal stock is
{W+1  0> W  0, W{W+1 =0 .
Remark 2: The necessary conditions can be extended to the inﬁnite
horizon case.
195 Application to a growth model in discrete
time
Consider an economy endowed at time w =1with a stock of renewable re-
source, denoted by {1.L e tfw  {w be the amount harvested in period w for
consumption by generation w. We assume that the transition equation is
{w+1  {w =( {w  fw)
  {w  j({w>f w) where 0 ??1
The utility of generation w is x(fw)=l nfw. The initial stock {1 is given. Under
our proposed welfare criterion, given any W , the planner ﬁnds the time path of
consumption to maximize welfare under the mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion.








subject to the transition equation and {(w)  0. Before solving this problem,
let us look at two polar cases. In the ﬁrst polar case,  =0 , so that the
objective function reduces to the conventional utilitarian criterion. In the
second polar case,  =1 , so the welfare criterion is the maximin one.
5.1 The polar utilitarian case  =0
To ﬁnd the solution for this polar case, we consider the Bellman equation
Y ({w)=m a x
fw
[lnfw + Y(({w  fw)
)]






({w  fw)31 
1+
1+uw
where 1+uw is the gross marginal product of the stock {w.T h i s e q u a t i o n
has the usual implication: if the rate of interest uw exceeds the rate of utility
20discount , then consumption should rise, i.e., fw+1 Af w.U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a t






It is easy to show that following policy rule is optimal
fw =( 1 ){w
The steady state stock is
{vv =( )
@(13)
To illustrate, assume {1 =0 =2>=0 =5 and  =0 =8.T h e n{vv =0 =40 and
fvv =0 =24=









5.2 The polar maximin case  =1
Turning to the other polar case where  =1 , it is optimal to set fw equal to
the amount fU that would maintain a constant stream of consumption (and
the stock is constant over time). Thus fU is the solution of
{2 =( {1  fU)

with {2 = {1. Solving for the case {1 =0 =2:
fU = {1  {
2
1 =0 =2  0=04 = 0=16
which is higher than the consumption level f1 obtained under the pure utili-
tarian case ( =0 ). The stock remains constant {w = {1 =0 =2 for all w  1.
215.3 Optimal path under the MBR Criterion
Assume  =0 =65. Then, given {1 =0 =2, the optimal paths of stock and
consumption are given below. The minimum standard of living constraint is
binding for two periods. From period 3 onward, the economy behaves as if
it were operating under the pure utilitarian regime from that date. Figure 1








6 The Continuous-Time Maximum Principle
under the MBR Criterion
Let (w) 5 (0>1] be a discount factor, ˙ @  (w) the discount rate, and
(w) an index of exogenous technological progress. Consider ﬁrst the case of






x({(w)>f(w)>(w))  x (5)




We assume that the technological progress index (w) is a dierentiable
function of time. Note that x must belong to a feasible set ]({0).I np a r t i c -
ular, we require x  xmax.( C l e a r l yxmax depends on the initial stock.)
226.1 The Necessary Conditions
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
K(w>{(w)>f(w)>(w))  (1  )(w)x({(w)>f(w)>(w)) + (w)j({(w)>f(w)>(w))
and the Lagrangian is
O(w>{(w)>f(w)>(w)>(w)>$(w)>x)=K + (w)k({(w)>f(w)>(w))
+$(w)[x({(w)>f(w)>(w))  x]
The necessary conditions may be stated as follows:
The maximum principle with control parameters (Hestenes The-
orem)16
(i) The maximum condition: The control variables maximize the Hamil-
tonian subject to inequality constraints (5) and (6)
(ii) The adjoint equations:
˙  = 
CO
C{










gw  0 ( =0if x ?x max)
and
{(W)  0, (W)  0, (W){(W)=0










16See Leonard and Long (1991), Theorem 7.11.1 for an exposition of Hestenes’ Theorem.
236.2 Implications for Genuine Savings
Let us deﬁne “present-value genuine savings” by
V(w)  (w)j({(w)>f(w)>(w))






Then, by deﬁnition of K and V,
g
gw
K =( 1 )˙ x(w)+( 1 ) ˙ x + ˙ V (7)
On the other hand,
CO
Cw
=( 1 )˙ x(w)+(w)j(=)˙  + (w)k(=)˙  +[ ( 1 ) + $]x ˙  (8)
Using (v), it follows that along the optimal path, utility is rising at time
w if and only if the rate of change in present-value genuine savings, adjusted
for technological progress impact (the term inside the curly brackets in the
equation below), is negative:
˙ V  {j + k +[ ( 1 ) + $]x} ˙  = (1  ) ˙ x (9)
i.e.
˙ V +( 1 ) ˙ x = {j + k +[ ( 1 ) + $]x} ˙  (10)
Thus,the constancy of present-value genuine savings ( ˙ V =0 )is consistent
with growing utility if technological progress impact is positive. In particular,
s u p p o s et h et e c h n o l o g i c a lp r o g r e s si m p a c ti sz e r o .T h e n ,a si sc l e a rf r o m( 9 ) ,
if utility reaches a peak at some time b w, present-value genuine savings must





˙ V = ˙ V
f +  ˙ V
f
Assume ˙ ?0> e.g. ˙ @  (w) A 0.T h e n˙ V(b w)=0is consistent with






= (b w).( 1 1 )
Proposition 1:
(a) Over any time interval where utility is constant, it holds that the rate
of change in present-value genuine savings is zero (if there is no technological
progress.)
( b )Z e r og r o w t hi ng e n u i n es a v i n g s(˙ V =0 )is consistent with positive
growth in utility only if technological progress is positive.
(c) Assume there is no exogenous technological progress. If utility reaches
ap e a ka ts o m et i m eb w, then “genuine savings” is at a local minimum at b w,a n d
“current-value genuine savings” may have reached a peak before time b w.
Proof: Parts (a) and (b) follows from (10). Part (c) follows from (10)
and (11). If utility reaches a peak at some time b w>then ˙ x(b w)=0and ¨ x(b w) ? 0,
implying ˙ V(b w)=0and V00(b w) A 0 .
Remark 3: Proposition 1 is a generalization of the ﬁrst proposition of
Hamilton and Withagen (2006), and Hamilton and Hartwick (2005).
6.3 Inﬁnite horizon optimization under the MBR cri-
terion
Suppose the time horizon is inﬁnite and the rate of discount  is a positive










Let #(w)=(w)31(w), (w)=(w)31(w) and z(w)=(w)31$(w). The current
value Hamiltonian is
K = x +( 1 )x({>f>)+#j({>f>)
25and the current-value Lagrangian is




=( 1 )xf + #jf + kf =0












gw  0 ( =0if x ?x max)
And the following transversality condition is part of the su!cient conditions
lim
w<"h
3w#(w)  0,a n d lim
w<"h
3w#(w){(w)=0 .
7 Optimal Renewable Resource Use under the
MBR Criterion
We consider a model of optimal management of a renewable resource. The
resource stock is {(w).I t sg r o w t hf u n c t i o ni s
˙ { = J({)  f
where J({) is a strictly concave function which reaches a maximum at some
{A0.W e c a l l { the “maximum sustainable yield” stock level. Assume
J(0) = 0 and J0(0) A 0.T h ev a r i a b l ef is the harvest rate.
The utility function is
x = X({>f)
which is homothetic, strictly concave and increasing, with Xf{  0, Xf({>0) =
4 and X{(0>f)=4.
26We deﬁne the “Golden Rule stock level” as the stock level that maxi-
mizes long-run sustainable utility:
max
{ X({>J({))






Clearly, {j A {.
By the “M o d i ﬁ e dG o l d e nR u l es t o c kl e v e l ”, we mean the stock level





This stock level is denoted by {.C l e a r l y
{ ?{ j
( T h i si sb e c a u s ea sw em o v ea l o n gt h ec u r v ef = J({) toward greater val-
ues of {,t h er a t i oJ({)@{ falls, so X{({>J({))@Xf({>J({)) falls, and thus
[X{({>J({))@Xf({>J({))] + J0({) is a decreasing function of {.)
Now consider the optimal growth program under the Mixed Bentham-
Rawls objective function. Assume 0 ??1.






˙ { = J({)  f
X({>f)  x
where {(0) = {0 A 0.
An interesting question is: under the MBR criterion, does the optimal path
approach a steady state that is somewhere between { and {j?P r o p o s i t i o n
2 below gives the answer.
27Proposition 2: Under the MBR criterion, the steady state depends on
whether the initial stock {0 is smaller or greater than {.
(i) If {0 A{ , the optimal path consists of two phases. Phase I begins at
w =0and ends at some ﬁnite WA0. During Phase I, utility level and the
resource stock are both falling. Genuine saving is negative and rises toward
zero. At time W,t h ep a i r({>f) reaches a steady-state pair ({>f ) where
f = J({).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
{ ?{  ?{ j
During Phase II, the system stays at the steady state ({>f ). Genuine saving
is constant and equal to zero. (See Figure 2.)
(ii) If {0 ?{ , the optimal path consists of two phases. Phase I begins
at w =0and ends at some ﬁnite WA0. During Phase I, utility is constant,
which implies a time path of falling harvest rate, and rising stock. Genuine
s a v i n gi nt h i sp h a s ei sp o s i t i v ea n di t sr a t eo fc h a n g ei sz e r o .I nP h a s eI I ,t h e
economy follows the standard utilitarian path and approaches asymptotically
the Modiﬁed Golden Rule stock level {. Genuine saving is positive and falls
steadily toward zero.
Proof:
To solve the problem, we deﬁne the current-value Hamiltonian and La-
grangian:
K = x +( 1 )X({>f)+#[J({)  f]
O = K + z[X({>f)  x]
The optimality conditions are
CO
Cf
=( 1  + z)Xf  # =0 (12)
˙ # = #[  J










1   + z
(13)
























Note that ˙ # =0i
X{
Xf
=   J
0({)
The question is: is it optimal to approach { where ˙ # =0 ?C a n˙ #A0
and yet (f>{) stay constant at a steady state? The answer is that if {0 A{ 
we should approach a steady state { A{  where ˙ s =0 . In what follows, we
construct the path that satisﬁes all the necessary conditions, and then apply
the su!ciency theorem to show that it is the optimal path.
From the deﬁnition of s
˙ s =
˙ #




1   + z
¶
Thus










1   + z
¶
Now we prove part (i) of the Proposition:
29Suppose {0 A{ . It is feasible to approach the modiﬁed golden rule stock
{ along a path with monotone non-increasing consumption. But it is not
b eo p t i m a lt od os o ,b e c a u s et h ew o r s eo  individuals (in the far distant
generations) can be made better o by approaching { A{ .
T os e et h i sf o r m a l l y ,w en o t et h a ti fw ea p p r o a c h{ then z(w)=0for all






So the optimal path must reach, in ﬁnite time, a steady state stock level
{ where







=   J
0({) ? J
0({)
At the steady state {, J0({) X{
Xf A 0,b u t˙ s =0as long as ˙ z satiﬁes the
condition
˙ z













At the steady state {
˙ #
#





























It is not possible to ﬁnd a closed form expression for { because { depends
on the initial stock {0. But we can state the conditions that must be satisﬁed.
Starting from {0 A{ , there are two phases.
In Phase I, utility is strictly falling, and xAx,s ot h a tz(w)=0 .D u r i n g
this phase, the harvest rate satisﬁes the condition




The evolution of # in Phase I is described by








In Phase II, f is a constant, ˙ #A0 but ˙ s =0 . During this phase
˙ z
1   + z















Let W denote the transition time from Phase I to Phase II. The following






31where z(W)=0 . Thus, from (14), and z(W)=0 ,w eg e t ,f o rw  W
z(w)=( 1 )h
t(w3W)  (1  )
Substituting into (15)



















This equation requires W to be an increasing function of t and hence an
increasing function of { :
W = e W({) (16)
Now consider Phase I. During this phase, z(w)=0 = We have two dieren-
tial equations
˙ { = J({)  f({>s)







with boundary conditions, {(0) = {0, {(W)={ and s(W)=Xf({>J({)).
These equations yield
W = b W({0>{ ) (17)
where C e W
C{0 ? 0 and C e W
C{ A 0.
The two equations (??)a n d( ??) yield
e W({)  b W({0>{ )=0




















It remains to show that [(=) is an increasing function for all {0 A{  (i.e.,




Part (ii) of the Proposition can be proved in a similar way.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this essay, I have reviewed a number of welfare criteria for comparing
long-term investment projects, and proposed a new one, called the Mixed
Bentham-Rawls Criterion, that I believe does justice to the Rawlsian notion
of intergenerational equity. I have restricted attention to the problem of
intergenerational equity, and to facilitate the analysis, I have abstracted from
intra-generational equity.
I have shown that optimal growth paths under the MBR criterion can
be characterised using standard techniques. These paths seem intuitively
plausible, and reﬂects both the Rawlsian concerns for the least advantaged,
and the utilitarian principle. I have also obtained a characterization of the
relationship between the growth rate of genuine savings and the growth rate
of utility.
Acknowledgments: This paper has beneﬁted from the useful comments
of Geir Asheim, Hassan Benchekroun, Gerard Gaudet, Seamus Hogan, Mur-
ray C. Kemp, Pierre Lasserre, Kim Long, Frank Stähler, participants at the
CIREQ conference on intergenerational allocation, and seminar partcipants
at University of Canterbury, University of Otago, and Victoria University of
Wellington.
33APPENDIX 1: An example in continuous time with zero discount
We consider a model of exploitation of a renewable resource. The resource
stock is denoted by {(w)  0.L e t(w)  0 be the eort level. The transition
equation is
˙ {(w)={(w)  {(w)
2  (w){(w) (19)
The quantity (w){(w) is called the harvest rate. Assume that the utility
derived from (w){(w) is
x({)=({)
31
The maximum sustainable yield is denoted by |P, and is deﬁned by
|
P =m a x









The objective function is to maximize
inf







subject to the transition equation, the constraint {(w)  0 and the initial
condition {(0) = {0.
We introduce the control parameter x and seek















subject to x((w){(w))  x,a n d( 1 9 ) .





˙ v = {
32 ˙ { = {
32 £
(1  ){  {
2¤
=1 (1  )v












˙ v =1 (1  )v
v(w)  0 and (w)  0=
Note that when v =0 ,w eh a v e˙ v =1A 0,s ov(w) is always positive, given
that v(0) A 0.
The Hamiltonian is





+ [1  (1  )v]
The Lagrangian is





The necessary conditions are
(i) (w) maximizes K
(1   + $)v




1   + $

¸1@2
A 0 for all ?0 (20)
Note that we can expect  to be negative, because it is the value of a marginal
increase in v, which is a marginal decrease in the true stock {.
(ii) The adjoint equation is
˙  = 
CO
Cv
=( 1  + $)
31 + (1  ) (21)












Substitute (20) into (21)
˙  =( )
(




Let us consider two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, when v is large (i.e., {
is small), the eort level (w) is chosen so that utility is constant while {
is allowed to grow (v is allowed to fall). In the second phase, (w) is kept
constant, and utility grows.
Consider the second phase. Let us conjecture that ˙  =0in this growing
utility phase. Then










This dierential solution has the solution
v(w)=2+Dh
3w@2
Thus v(w) converges to the steady state stock level vW =2(i.e., {(w) converges
to the maximum sustainable yield stock {W =1 @2).




D =[ v(W)  2]h
W@2
36So
v(w)=2+[ v(W)  2]h
W@2h
3w@2
The integral of utility is


















gw = 4(1  )(vW  2)
Now consider the ﬁrst phase. Assume v(0) Av W.
At time W, the utility ﬂow is
x = x(W)=(W)
31vW = 2vW
During the ﬁrst phase [0>W], the utility ﬂow is constant








(During the ﬁrst phase, as v(w) falls toward vW, (w) falls toward 1@2.)
Substituting into the transition equation:





Given v0 and vW(= x@2), we can integrate this equation to ﬁnd W = W(x).
The integral of utility in phase I is
Y1 =( 1 )xW(x)
37The total welfare is




The optimal x can then be determined. It can be veriﬁed that the optimal
x is lower than the maximin one (which is obtained by setting  =1 ), and
higher than the utilitarian one (obtained by setting  =0 ).
38Appendix 2: Further Notes on the Maximin Criterion
Many economists have criticized the maximin criterion. To them, this
criterion implies an extreme form of risk aversion. In contrast, Strasnick
(1976), using an axiomatic approach, argues that Rawls’s formulation of the
“original position” (when hypothetically individuals hiding behind the veil
of ignorance meet to choose the principles of justice) necessarily implies the
maximin principle17.
We note in passing that, in practical applications, expressions such as “the
worse o individual” should not be interpreted literally. According to Rawls
(1999, p. 84), “ for example, all persons with less than half of the median
(income) may be regarded as the least advantaged segment.”
A2. 1. Justiﬁcations of the maximin criterion in the absence of
intergenerational considerations
Rawls advocated the maximin criterion in an “atemporal” (i.e., non-intergenerational)
context. He postulated a hypothetical original position, in which the contract-
ing parties are individuals hidden behind the veil of ignorance: none of them
knows his place in society, his natural talents, intelligence, strength, and the
like. (The individuals are facing Knightian uncertainty, which is totally dif-
ferent from a situation of choice under risk.) In other words,the principles of
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. Rawls argued that the
contracting parties would agree to two principles of justice. The ﬁrst prin-
ciple says that “each person is to have an equal right in the most extensive
scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties
for others”(1999, p. 53).The second principle states that social and economic
inequalities are acceptable only if they are arranged so that they are “both
(a) to the greatest expected beneﬁt of the least advantaged and (b) attached
17His demontration relies on a set of axioms, the most important of which is Axiom
1 (Equal Priority Principle): For any four distributions g> b g, e g and g, and any pair of
individuals (D>E),i fb xD = xE then D’s preference of g over b g m u s th a v et h es a m ep r i o r i t y
as E’s preference of e g over g.
39to o!ces and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of op-
portunity”(1999, p. 72). Rawls called the second principle “the dierence
principle,” in preference to the more common term, “maximin.”
In formulating the second principle, Rawls had in mind the fact that some
degree of inequality may have an incentive eect that makes everyone better
o. To quote: “To illustrate... consider the distribution of income among so-
cial classes...Now those starting out as members of the entrepreneurial class...
have a better prospect than those who begin in the class of unskilled labor-
ers. It seems likely that this will be true even when the social injustices
which now exist are removed. What, then, can possibly justify this kind of
initial inequality in life prospects? According to the dierence principle, it
is justiﬁable only if the dierence of expectation is to the advantage of...the
representative unskilled worker. The inequality in expectation is permissible
only if lowering it would make the working class even more worse o...The
greater expectation allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do things
which raise the prospects of laboring class. Their better prospects act as in-
centives so that the economic process is more e!cient, innovation proceeds at
a faster space, and so on” (1999,pp. 67-68).
The tension between equity and e!ciency noted by Rawls was well recog-
nized by practitioners. As Lee Kwan Yew stated:
... “If performance and rewards are determined by the marketplace, there
will be a few big winners, many medium winners, and a considerable number of
losers. That would make for social tensions because a society’s sense of fairness
is oended....To even out the extreme results of free-market competition, we
had to redistribute the national income...If we over-redistributed by higher
taxation, the high performers would cease to strive. Our di!culty was to
strike the right balance.” (Lee, 2000, p. 116.)
A2.2. The maximin criterion for inﬁnite utility sequences
The maximin criterion, which Rawls prefers to call “the dierence princi-
ple”, was advocated by Rawls only for choice among distributions for individ-
40uals that belong to the same generation. When dealing with intergenerational
equity, Rawls argues that the dierence principle must be modiﬁed.( I will ex-
plain later Rawls’ arguments for a “modiﬁed dierence principle” which he
calls the “principle of just savings”.)
Despite this fact, many economists have used the maximin criterion as an
objective function for choosing among paths of consumption and investments
for all generations. The value taken on by the social welfare function (under






Not surprisingly, this criterion, when applied to inﬁnite sequences of utilities,
where utility of an individual depends only on his consumption vector, implies
that along the maximin path, the aggregate value of investments18 is zero at
each point of time19. Consider the standard neoclassical one-sector model.
Suppose the initial capital stock n1 is below the golden rule level nJ.T h e n
consumption can be maintained at the level fW
1 = i(n1)  pn1 A 0 for ever20.
Any attempt to raise future consumption would require current consumption
to fall below fW
1. Applying the maximin criterion, the “optimal choice” for
society is that all generations must remain poor. This outcome, according to
Rawls, oends our sense of justice.
A2. 3. Rawls’ s criticism of the maximin criterion for utility
sequences
Rawls has consistently argued that the maximin criterion, which he used as
a central piece for his theory of justice among contemporaneous individuals,
should not be applied to the choice among inﬁnite sequences of utilities of
18See Hartwick (1977), Dixit el al. (1980), Hartwick and Long (1999), Long (2005). Here,
it is assumed that all capital stocks are correctly priced, so that there is no divergence
between “prices” and “values.” Without correct pricing, an economist would be, in the
words of Oscar Wilde (1926, Act III, p. 113), “someone who knows the price of everything
and the value of nothing.”
19Strictly speaking, this is true for continuous time models. For discrete time models,
the aggregate value of investment is approximately zero along constant consumption paths.
20Here p i st h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n .
41generations of individuals. (See Rawls, 1971, section 44, and 1999, pp. 255-
7). To articulate a theory of justice between generations, Rawls suggests
that one must modify the assumptions concerning the original position, by
specifying that the the parties in the original position are “heads of families
and therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least their more
immediate descendants”(1999, p. 111). Rawls also introduces the constraint
that the just savings principle adopted must be such that the parties wish all
earlier generations to have followed it.
Why is it necessary to bring such modiﬁcations to the dierence principle?
T h ea n s w e ri ss i m p l e :t h eu n m o d i f e dd i erence principle would entail either
no saving at all or not enough saving to improve social circumstances. Such
as t a t eo fa airs would oend our sense of justice. In other words, one must
modify assumptions so as to “achieve a reasonable result”(1999,p. 255).
The absence of savings is a concern for Rawls, especially if one is con-
sidering a society with a very low initial level of capital, because, “to estab-
lish eective just institutions within which the basic liberties can be real-
ized”(1999,p.256), a society must have a su!cient material base. Generations
must “carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just
society”(1999,p.257).
Rawls did not advance a speciﬁc criterion to replace his dierence principle.
He only made the point that the dierence principle must be modiﬁed by a
“principle of just savings”. Such a principle should takes into account the fact
that “fathers care for their sons”. To quote Rawls (1971, p. 287-288):
“...The parties do not know which generations they belong to...They have
no way of telling whether it is poor or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural
or already industrialized....The veil of ignorance is complete in these respects.
Thus the persons in the original positions are to ask themselves how much
they would be willing to save at each stage of advance on the assumption that
all other generations are to save the same rates...Since no one knows to which
generation he belongs, the question is viewed from the standpoint of each...All
42the generations are virtually represented in the original position...Only those
in the ﬁrst generations do not beneﬁt...for while they begin the whole process
they do not share in the fruits of their provision. Nevertheless, since it is
assumed that a generation cares for its immediate descendants, as fathers
care for their sons, a just savings principle ...would be adopted.”
While Rawls was of the opinion that early generations should save for the
beneﬁts of future generations, he thought that the utilitarian approach may
require too much saving (1999, p.255)21.
A2. 4 The maximin criterion with consumption-based parental
altruism
Arrow (1973b) and Dasgupta (1974) were among the ﬁrst economists who
formulate a maximin criterion that incorporates Rawls’s concerns for just
savings. They postulated that the utility of generation w depends not only on
their own consumption level, but also that of the next generation. Thus
xw = x(fw>f w+1)
We say that the function x(fw>f w+1) is a “utility function with consumption-
based parental altruism” because the parents care about the consumption
vector fw+1 of their osprings, not about the latter’s utility level (which would
takes into account the utility level of their own future osprings). Under this
formulation, consider an economy starting at time w =0 . This economy must
choose, among all possible paths of consumption, the one whose lowest xw is
greater than the lowest xw0 of any other feasible path.
21It is interesting to note that Rawls’s concern that too much sacriﬁce is imposed on
the early generations had been voiced much earlier by a famous German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his essay, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopoli-
tan Purpose,” Kant put forward the view that nature is concerned with seeing that man
should work his way onwards to make himself worthy of life and well-being. He added:
“What remains disconcerting about all this is ﬁrstly, that the earlier generations seem to
perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them
a further stage from which they can raise still higher the structure intended by nature;
and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit
the building on which a whole series of their forefathers...had worked without being able
to share in the happiness they were preparing.” See Reiss (1970, p. 44).





He assumes that the economy is capable of a constant growth rate jA0:
nw+1 =( 1+j)[nw  fw]
It turns out that applying the maximin criterion to the sequence (x1>x 2>====)
of this economy, if Aj , the economy will choose a constant consumption
path. If ?j , the economy will experience cycles. As Dasgupta puts it, “The
economy is not allowed to lift itself permanently out of poverty if it begins
with a low value of n0=”(p.411).
Another troublesome feature of this model is that if when a new generation
takes over the control of the economy, it will choose not to follow the path
chosen by its predecessor. Thus we face the problem of “time inconsistency”.
O n ew a yo u to ft h i sp r o b l e mi st ot h i n ko f“ j u s ts a v i n g s ”n o ta sw h a tt h eﬁ r s t
generation tells later generations to do, but as what each generation would
do, taking into account that each successor will do what it will deem “just”.
In the game-theoretic language, one should be looking for a Nash equilibrium
sequence of saving rates. Dasgupta was able to characterize such a Nash
equilibrium in his simple model. Unhappily, in that equilibrium, the utility
sequence is not Pareto e!cient.
A2. 5 The maximin criterion with utility-based parental altruism
It is arguable that parents should care about their osprings’s utility
(rather than the latter’s consumption vector) which in turn depends on the
utility of the latter’s osprings. Maximin can then be applied to such a stream
of utilities. This is the approach adopted by Calvo (1978), Rodriguez (1981),
and Asheim (1988). Let wf denote a sequence of consumption starting from





v3wy(fv)=y(fw)+x(w+1f) where 0 ??1




Applying this criterion to the simple one-sector model, Calvo (1978) and
Rodriguez (1981) show that the optimal program is time-consistent. Unfortu-
nately, when the model is extended to have a non-renewable resource, Asheim
(1988) ﬁnds that time-inconsistency reappears.
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